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1Abstract
We provide a selective survey of empirical evidence on the eects as well as the drivers of
persuasive communication. We consider persuasion directed at consumers, voters, donors,
and investors. We organize our review around four questions. First, to what extent does
persuasion aect the behavior of each of these groups? Second, what models best capture
the response to persuasive communication? In particular, we distinguish information-based
models from preference-based models. Third, what are persuaders' incentives and what limits
their ability to distort communications? Finally, what evidence exists on the equilibrium
outcomes of persuasion in economics and politics?
Keywords: Persuasion, Communication, Beliefs
21 Introduction
The eciency of market economies and democratic political systems depends on the accuracy
of individuals' beliefs. Consumers need to know the set of goods available and be able to
evaluate their characteristics. Voters must understand the implications of alternative policies
and be able to judge the likely behavior of candidates once in oce. Investors should be
able to assess the expected protability of rms.
Some beliefs are shaped by direct observation. But a large share of the information on
which economic and political decisions are based is provided by agents who themselves have
an interest in the outcome. Information about products is delivered through advertising
by the sellers, political information comes from candidates interested in winning election,
and nancial data is released strategically to shape the perceptions of investors. Third par-
ties that might be more objective|certiers, media rms, nancial analysts|have complex
incentives that may diverge from the interests of recipients.
Scholars have reached sharply dierent conclusions about the implications of commu-
nication by motivated agents. Much of the early writing|shaped by the growth of mass
advertising in the late nineteenth century and the powerful propaganda campaigns of the
early twentieth|is pessimistic. Lippmann (1922), for example, sees citizens as largely at the
mercy of powerful persuaders. Democracy asks them to express opinions on topics about
which they can have no direct experience, and the fact that their views are shaped by those
in power undermines democracy's basic premise. Robinson (1933), Kaldor (1950), Galbraith
(1967), and others view advertising as anti-competitive and detrimental to welfare.
The alternative view is that persuasive communication is a more or less ecient provision
of information. That those providing the information have ulterior motives may be no more
troubling than the fact that Adam Smith's butchers and bakers act out of their own self
interest. Bernays (1928) defends the value of propaganda on the grounds that even distorted
communications are often informative. The inuential work of Stigler (1961) and Telser
(1964) shows that in a world of incomplete information advertising can enhance market
3eciency. Downs (1957) sees political campaigns and media coverage playing a similar role,
delivering information at low cost to voters who would have insucient incentive to seek it
out themselves.
In this review, we provide a selective survey of empirical evidence on the eects as well
as the drivers of persuasive communication. We dene a persuasive communication to be
a message provided by one agent (a sender) with at least a potential interest in changing
the behavior of another agent (a receiver). We exclude situations where an agent attempts
to manipulate another through means other than messages|providing monetary incentives,
for example, or outright coercion. We also depart from some existing literatures in using the
term persuasion to refer to both informative and non-informative dimensions of messages.
Some of the evidence we review comes from economists, including a recent surge of
work applying modern empirical tools. Other evidence comes from marketing, political
science, psychology, communications, accounting, and related elds. Our main focus is on
studies that credibly identify eects on eld outcomes. We do not attempt to review the
laboratory evidence on persuasion, nor do we discuss literatures where the outcome measures
are primarily self-reported attitudes. Even within these parameters, we inevitably omit many
important studies, and give only cursory treatment to others.
We consider four groups that are targets of persuasion: consumers, voters, donors, and
investors. We organize our review around four questions. First, to what extent does per-
suasion aect the behavior of each of these groups? Second, what models best capture the
response to persuasive communication? In particular, we distinguish belief-based models
from preference-based models. Third, what are persuaders' incentives and what limits their
ability to distort communications? Finally, what evidence exists on the equilibrium outcomes
of persuasion in economics and politics?
42 Is Persuasion Eective?
The simplest question addressed by studies in this literature is whether persuasive messages
have a measurable eect on receiver behavior. Credibly measuring the direct eect of per-
suasion is both important in its own right and an input to studying ner questions about
the way persuasion eects vary with sender incentives, receiver information, and so forth.
Wherever possible, we report results in terms of the \persuasion rate" (DellaVigna and
Kaplan 2007), which estimates the percentage of receivers that change the behavior among
those that receive a message and are not already persuaded. In a setting with a binary
behavioral outcome, a treatment group T, and a control group C, the persuasion rate f (in
percent terms) is






where ei is the share of group i receiving the message, yi is the share of group i adopting the
behavior of interest, and y0 is the share that would adopt if there were no message. Where
y0 is not observed, we approximate it by yC.1
The persuasion rate captures the eect of the persuasion treatment on the relevant be-
havior (yT   yC), adjusting for exposure to the message (eT   eC) and for the size of the
population left to be convinced (1 y0). For example, suppose that get-out-the-vote mailers
sent to the treatment group increase turnout by 1 percentage point relative to the control
group. The size of this eect may suggest that mailers are not very persuasive. However,
the implied persuasion rate can in reality be high if, say, only 10 percent of voters in the
treatment group received a get-out-the vote mailer (eT  eC is small) and the targeted popu-
lation already had high turnout rates of 80 percent (1 y0 is small). In this case, the implied
persuasion rate is f = 100  (:01)=(:1  :2) = 50 percent. If the persuadable population is
small, a small change in behavior can imply a high impact of persuasion.
1Assuming random exposure and a constant persuasion rate f, the share in group i who adopt the
behavior is yi = y0 + eif (1   y0). Rearranging this expression gives equation 1. Solving the system for y0,
one obtains y0 = yC   eC (yT   yC)(eT   eC). The approximation y0 = yC is valid as long as the exposure
rate in the control group is small (eC  0) or the eect of the treatment is small (yT   yC  0).
5Table 1 summarizes persuasion rates for the studies discussed below.
2.1 Persuading Consumers
The rst form of persuasion we consider is communication directed at consumers. Most
studies in this domain focus on communication from rms in the form of advertising. The
behavioral outcome is typically purchases or sales volume.
The earliest studies of advertising eects exploit messages that can be linked directly
to receiver responses. Shryer (1912), for example, places classied ads for a mail-order
business that include a code customers use when they reply. He compiles data on the
response rates of each ad he placed, and analyzes their relative eectiveness and the extent
of diminishing returns. This method is not ideal for measuring persuasion rates, since ads are
not randomized and the counter-factual responses in the absence of an ad are not observed.
The same methodology can be used to study online search advertising where the response
rate to individual ads is measurable directly.
Field experiments have long been used to study advertising eects, with many studies
carried out by advertisers themselves. Hovde (1936), for example, discusses \split-run" ex-
periments conducted in cooperation with the Chicago Tribune in which groups of subscribers
are assigned to receive dierent advertising inserts in their Sunday papers. Similar split-run
tests are discussed by West (1939), Zubin and Peatmen (1943), and Waldman (1956). Acko
and Emsho (1975) report on one of the earliest television advertising experiments|a series
of tests carried out by Anheuser-Busch between 1962 and 1964 in which dierent markets
are assigned dierent advertising levels. A large number of other market-level experiments
are reported by Aaker and Carman (1982), Eastlack and Rao (1989) and Hu, Lodish, and
Krieger (2007). Results using individual-level assignment of advertising exposure are re-
ported by McGuire (1977), Lodish et al. (1995), and Hu, Lodish, and Krieger (2007).
Overall, the results of these marketing studies provide little support for the view that
there is a consistent eect of advertising spending on sales. The Anheuser Busch studies nd
6that both increasing and decreasing advertising increased sales; these results led the rm to
signicantly cut advertising in most of its markets. Aaker and Carman (1982) and Lodish
et al. (1995) review large numbers of experiments and conclude that a large share of ads
have no detectable eect. Hu, Lodish, and Krieger (2007) is the only review of experimental
evidence that detects positive eects of advertising spending on average. The results of
all these studies must be interpreted with caution, because the assignment to treatment
and control conditions is often not randomized explicitly, and because the reported results
often lack sucient detail to assess the quality of the statistical analysis. Nevertheless, the
negative results are striking given that the most obvious biases would tend to overstate the
eect of advertising.
A series of recent papers by economists use eld experiments to estimate the eect of
persuasive communication on sales. The results, like those in the marketing literature, are
mixed. Simester et al. (2007) report a eld experiment in which they randomly vary the
number of catalogs individuals receive by mail from a women's clothing retailer. They nd
that increasing the number of catalogs in an 8-month period from 12 to 17 increases the
number of purchases during the test period by 5 percent for customers who had purchased
frequently in the past, and by 14 percent for those who had purchased relatively infrequently.
The eect on the extensive margin (the share of customers who purchase at least one item)
implies a higher persuasion rate percent for the frequent buyers (f = 7:0 percent) than
for the less frequent buyers (f = 4:3 percent) (Table 1).2 Lewis and Reiley (2009) report
the results of an online advertising experiment involving more than a million and a half
users of Yahoo whose purchases were also tracked at a large retailer. These subjects were
randomly assigned to either a treatment group that saw ads for the retailers or a control
group that did not. Because the ads were only shown on certain websites, only 64 percent of
the treatment group was actually shown ads. The purchases of the treatment group were 3
2In this case, we do not observe how many of the customers in the treatment group received and read the
catalogs, that is, we do not observe eT. In this and and in similar subsequent cases, we assume eT  eC = 1;
hence providing a lower bound for the persuasion rate.
7percent greater than the purchases of the control group, but this dierence is not statistically
signicant.3 Bertrand et al. (forthcoming) randomize the content of direct mail solicitations
sent to customers of a South African lender. They vary the interest rates oered, as well as
\persuasive" features of the mailer such as the picture displayed or the number of example
loans presented. Some features of the mailers{the picture displayed, for example{do have
large eects on loan takeup while others do not{comparisons with competitors, for example.
A nal body of evidence on advertising eects exploits naturally occurring variation.
Bagwell (2007) reviews the large literature studying correlations between monthly or annual
measures of aggregate advertising intensity and sales. These studies frequently nd large
advertising eects, although the endogeneity of advertising expenditure makes interpreting
the results dicult. A more promising approach is to exploit high-frequency variation in
advertising exposure. Thaivanich et al. (2000), for example, analyze data from a company
that advertises health care referral services on television. The television ads direct customers
to call an 800 number listed on the screen. Under the assumptions that (i) customers who
are persuaded by the ad to call the 800 number do so in a short window of time, (ii) short-run
variation in calls is uncorrelated with the timing of ads, and (iii) intertermporal substitutabil-
ity of calls is low, this data can allow valid estimation of advertising eects. The authors
nd that an additional television ad in an hour time block generates on the order of one ad-
ditional call. Similar assumptions justify studies by Tellis (1988) and Ackerberg (2001) who
use high-frequency individual-level supermarket purchase data matched to individual-level
advertising exposures. The latter study nds that an exposure to one additional commercial
per week has the same eect on purchases of an average inexperienced household as a 10-cent
price cut.
3The authors also report results for specications in which the independent variable is whether or not
individuals actully saw ads rather than whether or not they were assigned to the treatment group (i.e. actual
treatment rather than intent to treat). These \dierence-in-dierence" results do show a signcant positive
eect of advertising.
82.2 Persuading Voters
The second form of persuasion we consider is communication directed at voters. Such com-
munications may come from politicians themselves, interested third parties such as \get-out-
the-vote" organizations, or the news media. The relevant behaviors include the decision to
vote or not and the party chosen conditional on voting.
Early studies of political persuasion nd little evidence of eects on voters' choice of
candidates. In two famous studies, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) and Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) track the voting intentions and political views of survey re-
spondents over the course of presidential campaigns. They nd that after months of exposure
to intensive political communications, most respondents are more convinced of the political
views they began with. Very few switch allegiance from one party to the other, and such
switching is if anything negatively related to the extent of exposure to the campaigns. Sum-
marizing this and other survey-based research, Klapper (1960) writes \[R]esearch strongly
indicates that persuasive mass communication is... more likely to reinforce the existing
opinions of its audience than it is to change such opinions" (50). The consensus that com-
munication had \minimal eects" dominated research in political science, psychology, and
communications for decades (Gerber et al. 2007).
More recently, a number of political science studies have identied stronger relationships
between exposure to political communications and voting.4 In many cases, the variation
in communications that identies these models is strongly correlated with other factors
that aect voter behavior, making the results dicult to interpret. We do not review this
literature here.
In a rare eld experiment studying the eect of political advertising, Gerber et al. (2007)
works with a gubernatorial campaign in Texas preparing a major television and radio ad-
vertising buy. Rather than roll out the ads in all markets as would typically be the case,
the campaign randomly assigns markets to receive the ad campaign relatively early or rel-
4See Iyengar and Simon (2000) and Geys (2006) for reviews.
9atively late. Using a daily tracking survey of voters' attitudes, the authors nd strong and
signicant eects of television ads on reported favorability toward the various candidates.
A separate literature examines the impact of get-out-the-vote (GOTV) operations. Among
the earliest studies, Gosnell (1926) provided a card reminding of the necessity of registra-
tion to a treatment group of 3,000, and no card to a control group of 2,700 voters. This
card increased the registration rate from 33% in the control group to 42% in the treatment
group, implying a persuasion rate f = 13:4 percent. Eldersveld (1956) studied the ecacy
of dierent GOTV methods and found very large eects of GOTV campaigns, especially for
personal contacts (door-to-door and phone). However, the sample size of 391 voters is too
small to make precise inferences.
Building on these early studies, Alan Gerber, Donald Green, and co-authors run a series
of GOTV eld experiments (see Green and Gerber, 2008 for a a quadrennial review of this
literature). In most of these experiments, households within a precinct are randomly selected
to receive dierent GOTV treatments right before an election; the eects are measured using
the public records of turnout which can be matched ex post to the households targeted. This
methodology avoids the biases associated with self-reports of voting behavior. Gerber and
Green (2000) assign GOTV messages to 29,380 voters in a 1998 New Haven congressional
election. Door-to-door canvassing raises turnout from 44.8 percent to 47.2 percent which,
taking into account that only 27 percent of households in the treatment group are contacted,
implies a persuasion rate of f = 15:6 percent. Mailers of 1-3 cards with the same content
have a much smaller eect, implying a persuasion rate of only f = 1:0 percent. Green,
Gerber, and Nickerson (2008) nd large eects of door-to-door campaigning in 2001 local
elections (persuasion rate of f = 11:8 percent), and Green and Gerber (2001) demonstrate
large eects of personal phone calls in the 2000 election (persuasion rate of f = 20:5 percent
in one sample and f = 4:5 percent in another). (The eect of phone calls from marketing
rms is instead much smaller) The remarkable eectiveness of these simple interventions
with a personal contact (often a single phone call or personal visit) indicates how malleable
10the turnout decision is. A caveat is that these high persuasion rates apply to local election
where voters are likely to be less committed; convincing voters to turn out in presidential
elections is likely to be harder.
Beyond the literature on direct political communication, a number of recent papers focus
on the eect of the news media. Four papers consider the role of partisan media on vote share
with dierent identication methods: two papers exploit idiosyncrasies of media technology
that lead to variation in availability, one paper uses the precise timing of media messages,
and a last paper uses a eld experiment. In the rst category, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007)
study the eect of the introduction of the Fox News channel on voting in the 2000 election.
They show that whether towns had Fox News added to their cable systems between 1996 and
2000 is largely idiosyncratic, conditional on a set of controls. Using the voting data for 9,256
towns, they nd that the Presidential vote share for Republicans in 2000 is half-a-percentage
point higher in the towns oering Fox News, implying a persuasion rate of f = 11:6 percent
of the audience that was not already Republican5. They nd a similar eect for Senate races,
implying that the eect of Fox News extends also to races they do not cover. Enikolopov,
Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2009) use a related method to study persuasive eects of media in
Russia. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, all major television networks strongly supported
the government party except for a single independent station (NTV). NTV was only available
in some parts of the country, and the authors argue that this variation was largely driven
by idiosyncrasies of the network. The authors show that in areas with NTV access more
voters supported the anti-government party, implying a persuasion rate of f = 10:2 percent.
Knight and Chiang (2008) study the eect of newspaper endorsements on reported attitudes
of voters, exploiting the fact that dierent newspapers release their endorsements at dierent
times. They detect signicant eects of endorsements in cases where the endorsement was a
departure from the expected endorsement policy of the newspapers, but no eect in situations
where it was not. Finally, Gerber et al. (2009) uses a eld experiment to estimate the eect
5The persuasion rate for vote share as outcome variable acknowledges that the message can cause party
switches or turnout changes. See Appendix A for the expression.
11of partisan media coverage. They randomly assign subscriptions to a right-wing newspaper
(Washington Times) or a left-wing newspaper (Washington Post) in northeastern Virginia
one month before the November 2005 Virginia gubernatorial election. The authors use a post-
election survey to measure voting behavior, information, and attitudes after the election. On
most measures, they do not detect systematically signicant eects of the intervention. They
do nd a substantial increase in the share of (self-reported) Democratic voters for exposure
to the left-wing newspaper, corresponding to a persuasion rate of f = 20:0 percent.6 Overall,
these papers indicate a fairly consistent persuasion eect of 10 to 20 percent for news coverage
by a partisan media. While at rst look the point estimates of the eect on vote share appear
very dierent (0.4 pp. for Fox News, 2.2 pp. for NTV, 11.2 pp. for The Washington Post),
these dierences are reconciled by taking into account the exposure rates.
A second set of paper of papers on media eects consider the impact of the media on
voter participation. Gentzkow (2006) uses a natural experiment|the diusion of television
in the 1950's|to study the eects of access to television on voter turnout. Although the
timing of television's introduction was not random, the area reached by stations from a
given city is large. He is therefore able to compare observably similar counties that received
television relatively early or relatively late. He nds that the introduction of television is
associated with a drop in voter turnout of 2 percentage points per decade for congressional
elections, corresponding to a persuasion rate f = 4:3 percent. He documents that the
decrease in turnout is largely attributable to the substitution of local newspapers for TV,
leading to less knowledge about local politics. Consistently, the turnout drop is much smaller
for Presidential elections which are well covered by the television. Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2009) exploit sharp timing to estimate the eect of newspaper entries and exits on voting
using data from 1868-1940. They nd that an additional newspaper signicantly increases
voter turnout by .8 percent, implying a persuasion rate f = 5:1 percent. Both the qualitative
6However, they also nd that the share of Democratic voters increases (insignicantly) after exposure to
the right-wing paper, possibly because both newspapers reported information suggesting that the Democratic
candidate was better than expected.
12nding and the size of the persuasion eect are consistent with the ndings on introduction
of television. They also nd that partisan newspapers do not have signicant eects on the
share of votes going to Republicans, dierently from the other studies surveyed above.
2.3 Persuading Donors
The third form of persuasion we discuss is communication that solicits contributions to
non-prots or charities. This literature has focused mainly on direct communications from
the relevant non-prot. The outcome measures are monetary donations or non-monetary
contributions, such as of time or blood.
Some of the earliest studies are in psychology and sociology and examine the determi-
nants of blood donation, recycling, and helping decisions, often using experiments. Among
the other determinants, these studies document the importance of in-person contacts (Jason
et al., 1984) and the delicate role of incentives in inducing pro-social behavior: for example,
paying people to donate blood may reduce the donations because it crowds out intrinsic mo-
tivation (Titmuss, 1971). Recently, two economists (Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008) test
this hypothesis using a eld experiment. Among women, oering a monetary compensation
of about $7 lowers the rate of blood donations from 51 percent in the control group (with no
pay) to 30 percent. Consistent with the intrinsic motivation hypothesis, there is no decrease
if the money can be donated to charity. There is no eect on men.
Turning to the studies of fund-raising and monetary donations, academics only recently
started studying the eectiveness of dierent forms of solicitation.7 List and Lucking-Reiley
(2002) send letters to raise funds for the purchase of computers for a center at the University
of Central Florida. Importantly, the amount of seed money (the amount already raised)
stated in the dierent letters is randomized. The main result is that in the low-seed treat-
ment, 3.7 percent of recipients donate a positive amount, compared to 8.2 percent in the
7There is an extensive literature examining the response of charitable donations to variables such as tax
rates and income shocks (for a review, see Andreoni, 2006). This literature, however, typically relies on
aggregate measures of donations to charity from tax lings and does not examine the interaction of the
individual with a fund-raiser.
13high-seed treatment. This substantial eect of seed money on giving is likely due to inference
of higher quality of the charity in presence of high seed money. This paper spawned a very
active literature on fund-raising studies: charities collaborate with researchers and set up
eld experiments to investigate the impact of dierent fund-raising variables, such as the
personal content of the solicitation (in-person versus via mail) and the eect of gifts.
Landry et al. (2006) conduct a door-to-door campaign to fund-raise for a capital cam-
paign at East Carolina University. In their benchmark treatment (Table 1), 36.3 percent of
households open the door and 10.8 percent of all households contacted (including the ones
that do not open the door) donate, for an implied persuasion rate f = 29:7 percent. DellaV-
igna, List and Malmendier (2009), also using a door-to-door eld experiment, estimate the
willingness of households to complete a 10-minute survey on charitable giving (for no pay).
Among the households that answer the door, 24.8 percent complete the survey. Interestingly,
the persuasion rate for a donation or for survey completion in a door-to-door campaign is
very similar to the persuasion rate for get-out-the-vote door-to-door campaigns, suggesting
that consumers are very responsive to personal solicitations (Table 1). Indeed, in another
treatment of DellaVigna et al. (2009), as many as 10.9 percent of households opening the
door donate to an out-of-state charity, despite the fact that this charity is consistently ranked
last in a series of 5 charities in the survey treatment. This suggests that a genuine desire to
give is not necessarily the reason for donations in fund-raising drives.
In another example, Falk (2007) examines the importance of small gifts in triggering
higher donation. The context is the mailing of 9,846 solicitation letters in Switzerland to
raise money for schools in Bangladesh. One third of the recipients receives one postcard
designed by the students of the school, another third receives four such postcards, and the
remaining third receives no postcards. The three mailings are otherwise identical. The
donations are increasing in the size of the gifts. Compared to the 12.2 percent frequency of
donation in the control group, the frequency is 14.4 percent in the small gift and 20.6 percent
in the large gift treatment. The large treatment eects do not appear to aect the donations
14at next year's solicitation letter, when no gift is sent. Gifts, therefore, trigger substantial
positive reciprocity.
2.4 Persuading Investors
The fourth setting that we consider is communication directed at investors. A rst form of
this communication is the release of earnings announcements and other nancial statements
by companies themselves. A second is the release of recommendations and forecasts by
nancial analysts. In both cases, because individual data on investor response is typically
not available, the studies usually focus on aggregate response of stock prices, using an event-
study methodology. As such, these studies capture the response of the marginal, as opposed
to individual, investor.
The rst event study examining investor response to earnings information is Ball and
Brown (1968). Using the dierence between current and previous annual earnings as a
measure of new information, the authors nd a signicant correlation with stock returns in
the two days surrounding the earnings release. To get at more precise measures of the new
information, most recent studies use the median analyst forecast (the so-called consensus
forecast) to model investor expectations (see Kothari, 2001 for a review). The response to
earnings news using this measure is substantial. Companies in the top decile of earnings news
experience on average a positive return of 3 percent in the two days surrounding the release,
compared to an average -3 percent return for companies in the bottom decile of news.8 This
information is incorporated very quickly: using a sample of time-stamped announcements,
Lee (1992) shows that most of the stock price response occurs within 30 minutes of the
announcement.
This evidence is consistent with ecient information processing by the receivers, in line
with the underlying incentives and the presence of arbitrage. However, a phenomenon rst
captured by Ball and Brown (1968) and later studied among others by Bernard and Thomas
8These numbers, which are from DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) are representative of the literature.
15(1989), does not readily t into this schema. Companies which release positive earnings news
experience continuous increases in stock prices over the next 3-4 quarters, with the opposite
pattern happening for companies releasing negative news. This phenomenon, called the post-
earnings announcement drift, is puzzling to the theory of ecient markets since predictable
stock returns should be arbitraged away.
An important third party in the company-investor communication is the analyst. Since
collecting information on the protability of a company involves signicant costs, analysts
specializes in covering few stocks (5-25 typically) within an industry and provide the informa-
tion to investors. In this respect, the function of analysts in nancial communications is sim-
ilar to the one of the media in political reporting. Analysts provide investors with three types
of information about the performance of a traded company: (i) stock recommendations|a
buying or selling advice (Strong Buy/Buy/Hold/Sell/Strong Sell); (ii) earnings forecasts|
the forecasted prot per share at some future quarterly earnings announcement (e.g., 5 cents
per share); (iii) long-term growth estimates |the forecast for the growth of earnings in the
long-term (e.g., 3 percent per year). Theses piece of information are observable by investors
soon after release and are attentively monitored.
An early study of the impact of analyst recommendations is Cowles (1933). Using data
on 7,500 stock recommendation made by analysts in 16 leading nancial services companies
between 1928 and 1932, he estimates that the mean annual returns of following the recom-
mendations of the analysts is negative at -1.43%. Little research follows this negative result
on the recommendation of analysts until systematic data sets of analyst recommendations
and forecasts become available in the 1980s and 1990s. Womack (1996), using one of these
data sets (First Call), shows that on the three days surrounding the addition of a stock to
a list of Buy recommendations stock returns increase 3.27 percent; conversely, the addition
to a list of Sell recommendations is accompanied by negative -4.32 percent returns. These
returns are about the same size as the response to very positive or very negative earnings
news (see above) and are not themselves explained by earnings news. A second key nding
16of this study is that, as for earnings announcements, there is a positive drift for new Buy rec-
ommendations and a negative drift for new Sell recommendation in the 6 months following
the addition. Later studies such as Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2003) largely
conrm these results.
3 What Models Best Capture the Response to Persua-
sive Communication?
The evidence reviewed above demonstrates the eectiveness of persuasive messages. What
factors determine the way a particular message aects receivers' behavior? Existing models
of persuasion eects can be divided broadly into two categories.
In the rst category, persuasion aects behavior because it changes receivers' beliefs.
This includes models where receivers are rational Bayesians, such as informative (Stigler
1961; Telser 1964) and signalling (Nelson 1970) models of advertising, cheap talk models
(Crawford and Sobel 1982), persuasion games (Milgrom and Roberts 1986), and persuasion
mechanisms (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2009). It also includes models where receivers are
not fully Bayesian, and think categorically (Mullainathan 2001; Fryer and Jackson 2003;
Mullainathan, Schwarzstein, and Shleifer 2008), have limited memory (Mullainathan 2002;
Shapiro 2006), double-count repeated information (DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel, 2003),
or neglect the incentives of the sender (Eyster and Rabin 2009). We refer to these models
as\belief-based."
In the second category, persuasion aects behavior independently of beliefs. This includes
models such as Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1993) where advertis-
ing enters the utility function directly, as well as older models of \persuasive" advertising
(Braithwaite 1928). This category also includes some dimensions of psychological models
of persuasion where non-informative "peripheral" factors may play a central role (see e.g.
Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Cacioppo 1996). We will stretch terminology somewhat
17and refer to all such models as\preference-based."
Distinguishing dierent models of persuasion is particularly important because they have
very dierent implications for welfare. In a simple belief-based model with rational receivers,
the existence of persuasive communication cannot make receivers worse o. In this case,
increasing the supply of information and making information markets more competitive will
tend to improve welfare. Welfare eects are harder to evaluate if receivers are not Bayesian
or if persuasion works through emotion or preference change.
Regardless of the model, messages are only eective if they are actually received. In
many settings, receivers make active decisions about what information to seek out and how
to allocate their attention, and the way they make these decisions has important implications
for the eectiveness of persuasion in equilibrium. At the end of this section, we briey review
evidence on the way endogenous exposure mediates persuasion eects.
3.1 Predictions of Belief-Based Models
A rst core prediction of most belief-based models is that persuasion will tend to be more
eective when receivers are less certain about the truth. In Bayesian models, the weaker are
receivers' priors, the more their beliefs are aected by a given piece of new information. This
may (though need not) imply larger eects on behavior. In limited memory or categorical
thinking models, behavior will also typically be less elastic when receivers are close to certain
about the state ex ante.
Ackerberg (2001 and 2003) tests the prediction that advertising has a larger eect for
consumers who have little experience with a product. His study combines data on a panel
of consumers' purchases with data on their exposure to television advertisements, focusing
on a new brand of yogurt Yoplait-150. Identication of advertising eects here is non-
experimental, and relies on individuals' exposure to ads for the yogurt being orthogonal
to their pre-determined taste for yogurt. This assumption would be violated, for example,
if advertisers run ads on programs whose viewers are dierentially likely to buy yogurt.
18Ackerberg shows that consumers who have bought the product in the past (and so have
more information about its characteristics) are less sensitive to advertising than those who
have never bought, consistent with the prediction. As mentioned earlier, the eect of an
additional ad per week on inexperienced households is equivalent to a 10 cent price cut; the
eect on experienced households is a fth the size and not signicantly dierent from zero.
Several of the other studies summarized in Section 2.1 also look at the interaction be-
tween advertising and consumer experience. Simester et al. (2007) shows that the eect on
purchases of sending catalogs is larger on the intensive margin for consumers that previous
purchased infrequently than for consumers that previously purchased frequently. The rst
group is less likely to have precise priors on the products oered. Thaivanich et al. (2000)
nd that advertisements for the health care referral service have larger eects in markets
where the service was only recently introduced. A number of studies beginning with Shryer
(1912) nd diminishing returns to repeating the same advertisement (at least as the number
of repititions gets large), which is consistent with receivers' priors becoming increasingly
strong over time.
The role of receiver priors has also been tested in the domain of political persuasion. Zaller
(1992) shows that individuals with high political awareness updated their views of Ronald
Reagan less in the wake of the Iran-Contra aair, in part because their prior knowledge of
Reagan's performance was more extensive. Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2009) nd
that the eect of access to independent television news in Russia on voting is largest for those
with less prior political knowledge and those who use alternative information sources less.
Prior (2006) uses survey data from 1958-1970 to estimate the cross-sectional correlation of
knowledge of incumbent House politicians and propensity to vote for incumbents on the one
hand, and availability of television stations on the other. He nds no systematic relationship
on average, but nds a positive correlation for less-educated voters. Such correlations must
be interpreted with caution, but they are consistent with the view that the eects of television
should be greatest among voters who have the least prior knowledge.
19A second prediction specic to Bayesian belief-based models is that receivers' inferences
from a given message will depend on what they know about the credibility of the sender. If a
university changes its standards so that a larger share of students receive A's, the impact of
knowing a student received an A on a receiver's beliefs should become smaller. A republican
endorsement from a newspaper that always endorses republicans should carry less weight
than a republican endorsement from a newspaper that typically endorses democrats. Non-
Bayesian models do not necessarily share this prediction, and Eyster and Rabin (2009) posit
specically that receivers will adjust too little for sender credibility.
The study by Knight and Chiang (2008) discussed above provides some evidence from
the political arena. Consistent with the Bayesian model, they nd large eects of newspaper
endorsements on voting only in cases where the endorsement is a \surprise" in the sense that
the paper supports a party it typically opposes. When a newspaper endorses the same party
repeatedly, their endorsements have no signicant eect.
Most evidence on source credibility comes from the literature on nancial analysts. Kadan
et al. (2008) study a 2002 regulation that required brokerage houses to publicize the share of
their analysts' recommendations in the sell, hold, and buy categories (NASD Rule 2711 and
amended NASD Rule 472). In response, most houses increased the share of sell and hold
recommendations: after the regulation, about 20 percent of the recommendations are sell
and 44 percent hold, up from, respectively, 5 percent and 26 percent before the regulation.
Consistent with the Bayesian model, stock returns after the reform respond more to buy
recommendations (which are now less common and hence more informative) and less to sell
and hold recommendations (which are more common and less informative). Of course this
does not show that receivers make correct inferences from these recommendations, only that
their inferences shifts in the predicted direction.
Additional evidence on source credibility comes from studies of analysts' conicts of
interest. As discussed at more length below, analysts face strong incentives to provide pos-
itive recommendations. These incentives are especially strong for aliated analysts|those
20whose companies also provide investment banking services to the companies the analysts
cover. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) ask whether investors take these incentives
into account. They rst replicate previous ndings showing that aliated analysts system-
atically give more buy or strong buy recommendations than unaliated analysts. The bias
is suciently strong that a rational investor should essentially neglect the recommendations
of aliated analysts. The authors then show that institutional investors (proxied by large
trades) do not respond to buy and strong buy recommendations issued by aliated analysts,
while individual investors (proxied by small trades) appear to take the recommendations at
face value: they buy in response to buy recommendations and hold in response to hold
recommendations, and do not distinguish between aliated and not aliated analysts. De
Franco, Lu, and Vasvari (2007) focus on a specic set of analyst recommendations that were
alleged by the SEC to have been deliberately distorted as a result of conicts of interest.
Consistent with Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), they show that individual investors
buy in response to the optimistically-biased recommendations. They also show that insti-
tutional investors sell in response to the optimistic recommendations, consistent with them
recognizing both that the recommendations are biased and that individual investors will over-
respond. Taken together, this evidence suggests that sophisticated agents adjust for sender
credibility as the Bayesian model would predict, while inexperienced agents under-adjust as
in Eyster and Rabin (2009).
We discuss one laboratory study in this connection because it is so directly relevant to
the issue at hand. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) conduct a simple experiment where
subjects are paid for the precision of the estimates of the number of coins in a jar. Since
they see the jar only from a distance, they have to rely on the advice of a second group of
subjects, the advisors, that inspect the jar from close. The two experimental treatments vary
the incentives for the advisors. In a rst treatment, the advisors are paid for how closely
the subjects guess the number of coins; in a second treatment, the advisors are paid for
how high the subjects' guess is. Despite the fact that the incentives are common-knowledge,
21the estimate of the subjects is 28 percent higher in the second treatment. The leading
interpretation of this nding is that the subjects do not discount enough for the conict of
incentives of the advisors.
3.2 Predictions of Preference-Based Models
The simplest prediction that distinguishes preference-based models from belief-based models
is that the content of messages may aect behavior even when it conveys no information.
Conclusively identifying such content is dicult, because even apparently non-informative
features of messages may still serve as informative signals in equilibrium (Nelson 1970). Also,
non-informative dimensions may aect belief formation through channels such as framing,
salience, and attention (Zaller 1992; Mullainathan, Schwarzstein, and Shleifer 2008), making
the distinction between belief-based and preference-based models blurry. Nevertheless, many
pieces of evidence on how persuasion operates are hard to rationalize with at least the
simplest belief-based models of persuasion.
One piece of evidence is the content of messages themselves. Many have noted, for
example, that advertisements typically contain imagery, humor, narrative, and other content
that does not convey any obvious information. Resnik and Stern (1977) estimate that only
half of broadcast television advertisements can be classied as informative. Mullainathan
and Shleifer (2005) note the example of a shampoo brand advertised with a slogan \We put
silk in a bottle," even though the rm acknowledges that silk has no eect on the performance
of shampoo. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) also show that the non-informational content
of Merril Lynch advertising campaigns varies systematically with market conditions. Their
ads' images evoke security and reliability (e.g. a grandfather shing with his granddaughter)
when market growth is low, and evoke modernity and aggressiveness (e.g. a bull wired to
a circuit board) when market growth is high. They argue that these patterns are most
consistent with a model where rms design ads to tap into consumers' existing beliefs rather
than convey or signal new information about their products.
22In a demonstration of the eect of non-informational content, Bertrand et al. (forthcom-
ing) randomize the content of direct mail solicitations sent to customers of a South African
lender. They vary the interest rates oered, as well as features of the mailer such as the
picture displayed and the number of \example loans" presented. The authors nd that the
persuasive features are jointly (marginally) signicant in predicting loan takeup. The manip-
ulations with the strongest eects are: (i) presenting a simple table with only one example
loan rather than several; (ii) not including a suggested use for the loan; (iii) and including
a picture of an attractive female. All three of these eects are roughly equivalent to a two
percentage point reduction in the monthly interest rates (Table 1, the rate varied from 3.25
percent to 11.75 percent). The pattern of results is not clearly organized by any particular
theory of how advertising content matters, but it provides evidence that non-informational
dimensions such as the attractive picture can have economically large eects.
Landry et al. (2006) present related evidence from the door-to-door fund-raising cam-
paign discussed in section 2.3. They show that a one standard deviation increase in attrac-
tiveness of the female solicitors increases the amount raised by 50 percent. The eect only
occurs when males open the door. This suggests that the personal interaction impacts the
willingness to pay. The importance of personal interaction is also consistent with the pattern
of results in Gerber and Green (2000) who nd the largest persuasion rates for in-person
visits, followed by phone calls and then mailers.
A second prediction that distinguishes preference-based models is that receivers may take
costly steps to avoid exposing themselves to persuasion. Because there is free disposal of
information, messages in a belief-based model cannot make receivers worse o in expectation
(except for a time cost), so we should not generally see costly avoidance behavior. Becker
(1996) notes the example of pedestrians who cross the street to avoid passing a beggar. This
behavior is hard to understand unless passing the beggar, or especially passing the beggar
and refusing to give money, has a direct negative eect on utility. DellaVigna, List, and
Malmendier (2009) test directly for costly avoidance in the context of charitable giving using
23a eld experiment. They compare the fund-raising in a standard door-to-door campaign
to a campaign in which the households are notied a day in advance about the upcoming
fund-raising drive with a door-hanger. They nd that the door-hanger reduces the share of
households at home by 10 to 25 percent and lowers giving by 30 percent if the door-hanger
has a `Do Not Disturb' check-box. This suggests that the persuasion of donors operate in
part through social pressure, inducing households to take costly steps to avoid exposure to
the solicitation.
3.3 Demand for Information and Limited Attention
The eectiveness of persuasion depends in many settings on receivers' decisions about what
information to seek out and how to allocate attention.
Several studies show that potentially valuable information is ignored even when it is
public information, due to either high costs of information acquisition or non-rational limited
attention (see DellaVigna 2009). Huberman and Regev (2001) chronicle the market reaction
to results suggesting a drug patented by the company EntreMed might cure a type of cancer.
On November 28, 1997, these results are reported by Nature and on page A28 by the New
York Times. Unsurprisingly, the stock price of EntreMed increases by 28 percent. Five
months later, on May 4, 1998, the New York Times publishes a front page an article on
EntreMed that is almost identical to the article published earlier. Despite the fact that
the article contains no new hard information, it leads to a 330 percent one-day return for
EntreMed, and to a 7.5 percent one-day return for all bio-tech companies, moving billions of
dollars in market capitalization. The stock price of EntreMed does not revert to the previous
level over the whole next year. Several interpretations of these events are possible, but what
is clear is that the way public nancial information is disseminated can signicantly aect
the market reaction.
Two studies document more systematically the importance of limited attention in the
context of quarterly earnings releases by companies. As we discussed in Section 2.4, com-
24panies that release positive earnings news experience an increase in stock returns over the
next 2-4 quarters. A leading interpretation of this phenomenon is that investors are slow
to respond to the new pieces of information (Hong and Stein, 1999). If this is the case,
one would expect even more underreaction to earnings news on days on which investors'
costs of processing the information are high. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) examine releases
taking place on Friday (versus other weekdays), under the assumption that the weekend is a
distracting force. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (forthcoming) examine releases taking place on
days with a higher number of earnings announcements, under the assumption of attention
as a xed resource. The two papers nd very similar evidence that on low-attention days
the initial incorporation of the earnings news into stock returns is 20 percent slower, with a
higher drift. An obvious confound for these papers is the fact that companies can time the
release of their earnings and therefore the companies that release on low-attention days may
systematically dier. However, the selection would need to explain why companies releasing
on low-attention days experience both less immediate response and more delayed response.
The endogeneity of receivers' attention is also important in political persuasion. A per-
suasive argument to vote Republican will have little eect if it only reaches those who are
already committed Republicans. (It can still have an eect if it aects the turnout decision).
The classic studies of political campaigns by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) and
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) demonstrate that most voters are exposed mainly
to campaign messages consistent with their pre-existing beliefs. Similarly, several studies of
news markets document a strong demand on the part of consumers for news that has a po-
litical slant consistent with their own views (Gentzkow and Shapiro forthcoming; Gentzkow
and Shapiro 2004). This may be driven by both irrational \conrmatory bias" (Lord, Ross,
and Lepper 1979) and rational inferences about quality by consumers with heterogeneous
priors (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). Regardless of the mechanism, it implies that the over-
all eect of persuasive messages (or of important new information) could be smaller than it
would be in a world where receivers' demand for news was independent of their prior beliefs.
254 What are Senders' Incentives?
Most of the studies reviewed so far treat the content or quantity of persuasive messages as
exogenous and study the eect on receivers' behavior. In markets, however, the supply of
persuasion is endogenous. It is therefore important to understand the forces that determine
the supply of persuasive messages in equilibrium.
Senders' incentives in persuasive markets are complex. Their interest in aecting receiver
behavior may be direct, as with a politician trying to get elected, or indirect, as with a
media rm that wishes to curry favor with a politician. This will naturally give senders an
incentive to distort information. A countervailing force for accuracy is the desire to build
a reputation: if receivers are rational, senders may benet from committing to limit the
incentive to distort, or to report accurately. These two forces|the incentive to distort and
the incentive to establish credibility|may play out dierently in dierent markets, and their
relative strength will be a key determinant of the extent to which persuasive communications
have benecial or harmful eects.
Even if a monopoly sender has no incentives to build credibility, a sender in a competitive
market may. A media rm that distorts news, for example, may pay a signicant cost if this
fact is revealed by its competitors, as long as the audience cares suciently about accuracy
and consumers have largely rational beliefs.
4.1 Incentives of Advertisers
In the simplest model of advertising, rms do not internalize any benets from accuracy.
They just want to sell. As such, communication can be pure cheap talk. This tendency
may be limited if senders include veriable information or if regulation or reputation create
incentives for accuracy. Also, advertising campaigns can have an eect even if they do not
convey credible information as long as they have a direct impact on preferences. The large
scope for distortion in advertising may partly explain the failure to nd consistent eects on
26receiver behavior (section 2.1).
One domain where distortions in advertising have been quantied is pharmaceutical ad-
vertising in medical journals. Villanueva et al. (2003), for example, study 264 advertisements
for antihypertensive and lipid-lowering drugs published in Spanish medical journals in 1997.
They count the number of claims in the ads that were supported by bibliographic citations,
and then assess whether the studies cited indeed back up the claims. In 44 percent of cases,
the authors nd that the claims are not supported by the studies. Cooper and Schriger
(2005), van Winkelen et al. (2006), and Greving et al. (2007) perform similar analyses,
nding large numbers of claims that are not supported by research or that are supported
only by research sponsored by the manufacturer.
The conict of interest induced by the advertisers' incentives implies an important role
for potentially objective third parties. Consumer Reports, for example, provides product rat-
ings, US News and World Report provides university rankings, and the American Democracy
in Action provides quantitative measures of the voting record of politicians. The information
from certiers can have substantial eects on consumer behavior. Jin and Leslie (2003) study
the case of the introduction of health scores for restaurants in the L.A. area. Following a
prominent food poisoning episode, dierent areas in LA required restaurants to prominently
post a hygiene score. Jin and Leslie nd that the introduction of the report cards substan-
tially increases the attendance to highly-rated restaurants and lowers the incidence of food
poisoning episodes at the hospital.
4.2 Incentives in Financial Reporting
Firms often have an incentive to distort their nancial reports to make outcomes look more
favorable to investors. Such distortions are substantially constrained, however, by regulation.
In both quarterly and annual releases, the companies report earnings (protability) per share,
which by regulation must conform to one of two accounting standards (GAAP or \street").
Hence, while the CEO in the periodic communication can emphasize underlying trends,
27new products, or signicant investments, the attention of the investors is largely focused
on one standardized number. Moreover, earnings releases occur at a pre-scheduled time,
and rm managers cannot release any protability information in advance of this call. The
high information content of nancial releases is consistent with the substantial reaction of
investors (section 2.4).
Despite the constraints imposed by regulation, several studies present evidence that rms
manipulate reported earnings. DeGeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) document an asym-
metry in the distribution of earnings surprises: there are substantially more announcements
that meet the analyst consensus forecast by 1 or 2 cents than announcements that fail to
meet the forecast by 1 or 2 cents. This suggests that rms that would barely miss the fore-
cast, anticipating a negative response by investors, adopt accounting management to be able
to meet the expectations.
Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) show that rms with a high value for net oper-
ating assets, a proxy for accounting management, experience in later quarters worse earnings
news, as well as substantially lower stock returns. Accounting management typically involves
intertemporal substitution of certain discretionary items, such as accounts receivable, and so
are likely to lead to more negative earnings releases in the future. A trading strategy based
on the results of this study earns annual returns in excess of 15 percent. This suggests that
investors do not fully appreciate the extent of the accounting manipulations, which in turn
makes it worthwhile for companies to undertake them.
A more subtle manipulation exploits the two measures of earnings, the GAAP number and
the \street" (also called pro-forma) number, which dier in the treatment of extraordinary
items such as restructuring charges. Dyck and Zingales (2003) show that rms report the
more favorable number more prominently in their press release. They also show that the
media coverage of the earnings tend to follow the same pattern. In response, the stock
returns in the two days surrounding the announcement responds more to the number that
the rm emphasized than to the other number. Again, the fact that investors do not undo the
28accounting distortion makes it protable for rms to engage in such behavior in equilibrium.
4.3 Incentives of Financial Analysts
Unlike companies advertising their products, analysts provide information whose accuracy is
easy to measure: earnings forecasts can be compared to the actual release, and recommen-
dations, at least in principle, can be benchmarked against the stock performance. Such ex
post veriability can signicantly limit the incentives for distortion. We might expect that
maximizing forecast precision should will be the key incentive for analysts.
However, analysts also face strong incentives to provide forecasts favorable to the compa-
nies they cover. Analysts that provide positive coverage of a company have easier access to
company information and are not subject to continuous pressure by the company to change
their outlook. Additional distortions exist for sell-side analysts, that is, the ones that work
within investment banks. Investment banks derive little if any revenue from selling the
analyst reports which quickly enter the public domain. The major sources of prots are cor-
porate nance transactions, such as mergers and secondary equity issuances. Analysts are
therefore under enormous pressure to provide positive coverage of companies that provide
such transactions. The analysts covering such companies, aliated analysts, therefore face
a stronger conict of interest.
Since analysts careers are observable, it is possible to study how promotions and de-
motions depend on the precision in forecasts and on the bias of the forecasts. Hong and
Kubik (2003) measure movements of analysts between high-status brokerage houses (such
as Goldman Sachs) and low-status brokerage houses (typically more specialized ones). They
relate the likelihood of these movements to measures of the accuracy of forecasts (the mean
absolute forecast error for past earnings forecasts, relative to other analysts) as well as mea-
sures of optimism (the fraction of forecasts that are above the consensus forecast). The key
result is that optimism counts more than accuracy in determining career shifts. An analyst
in the top 10 percent of optimism score is 90 percent more likely to be promoted, compared
29to the remaining analysts. The corresponding eect of being in the top 10 percent of accu-
racy is only a 41 percent increase in the promotion probability. Similarly, forecast optimism
lowers the probability of demotion more than accuracy. The authors also nd (marginally)
statistically signicant evidence that for demotions of aliated analysts, who face a stronger
conict of interest, optimism matters more and accuracy less. This evidence implies that
the analysts face a very severe conict of interests.
Does this conict of interest aect recommendations in equilibrium? One test is to
compare the distribution of recommendations to what we would expect if the labels \buy,"
\hold," and \sell" were interpreted literally. In that case, unbiased analysts should on
average issue approximately as many recommendations to buy a stock as to sell a stock,
while distorted analysts should issue more buy recommendations. Figure 1 provides evidence
on the distribution of recommendations (the data is from Malmendier and Shanthikumar,
2007): less then 5 percent of recommendations are Sell or Strong Sell recommendations, and
about 60 percent of recommendations are Buy or Strong Buy. The bias in favor or Buy
recommendations is even stronger for the aliated analysts, for which the share of Buy or
Strong Buy recommendations is larger than 70 percent.9
The size of the distortion is such that on average a sophisticated investor should interpret
a buy recommendation as a recommendation to hold a stock, and a hold recommendation as
an invitation to sell. In addition, investors should essentially neglect the recommendations
of aliated analysts. As we discussed above, this is precisely how institutional investors
appear to respond to recommendations, while individual investors fail to adjust for these
distortions (Malmendier and Shantikumar, 2007).
The distortions in quarterly earnings forecast take a more nuanced format. Compa-
nies generally prefer optimistic earnings forecasts. However, when the earnings release is
imminent, the preference shifts towards cautious forecasts, which are easier to meet or ex-
9While the distortions are plausibly due to conict of interest, an alternative interpretation is that they
are instead due to optimism: analysts choose to cover companies that they have a positive outlook for. This
alternative interpretation however does not explain why aliated analysts, who face a stronger conict of
interest, have an even larger bias.
30ceed. This is particularly true given that, especially in recent years, top managers can only
sell stock in their company in a short time window after the earnings announcement, and
they benet from a positive earnings surprise. Consistent with this, Richardson, Teoh, and
Wysocki (2004) document a `walk-down' of analyst forecasts for the 1990s: forecasts are the
most optimistic at horizons of one year or more before the release, they become monotoni-
cally less optimistic but remain largely above the (ex-post) realized earnings until 3-4 months
before the release, at which point they turn pessimistic. In the earlier years (1980s), when
manager incentives to boost short-term stock prices are lower, there is still a walk-down, but
the forecasts remain optimistic over the whole sample.
Further, we expect the most biased analysts to provide both the most positive recom-
mendations and the least positive earnings forecasts near the release date. Indeed, there
is a negative correlation between recommendations and forecasts for aliated analysts, for
whom the conict of interest is strongest (Malmendier and Shantikumar, 2009).
Analysts forecasts are the only domain we are aware of where there is direct evidence
on the eect of competition. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) consider the shifts in analyst
competition induced by the merger of investment banks. Following such mergers, analysts
covering similar stocks in the two banks are often laid o. Using these mergers as instruments
for decreased competition, they estimate that the remaining analysts that now face less
competition increase their optimism bias in earnings forecasts by about 10 percent. This
increase in bias holds also when the authors focus on the optimism of analysts working in
banks not aected by the merger. The authors also document a similar eect on optimism in
the long-term growth forecast and a smaller eect on recommendations. Hence, it appears
that competition may moderate the analyst bias, though it is unlikely to erase it.
4.4 Incentives of the Media
Like analysts, media rms face complex incentives. Most obviously, they benet from in-
creasing consumer willingness-to-pay in terms of money and time for their products. This
31generates both direct revenue (newspaper or magazine subscriptions, for example) and rev-
enue from advertisers who are willing to pay more the more consumers they can reach.
Whether catering to consumers leads them to provide accurate information depends on what
consumers demand. If consumers value accuracy, market incentives will usually push rms
to provide it, so long as ex post feedback on which stories were right and which were wrong
is suciently strong. If consumers do not value accuracy and are just as happy with ction
that entertains them or supports their political beliefs, we expect the scope for distortion to
be large.
The scope for distortion also depends on other \supply-side" incentives of rms to ma-
nipulate content. Media owners may have personal preferences over political outcomes.
Politicians, advertisers, or other interested parties may exert pressure on media rms to
mould content in ways these parties prefer. Reporters may prefer writing stories that align
with their personal political views.
To evaluate the importance of these forces in the U.S. newspaper markets, Gentzkow and
Shapiro (forthcoming) use automated searches to measure the political slant of 420 US news-
papers. They use these measures to estimate the demand for slant (the readers' preferences)
and the supply of slant (the newspaper's preferences). They document a statistically and
economically signicant demand for slant consistent with consumers' own ideologies. The
data do not reject the hypothesis that newspapers respond to this demand by choosing slant
to maximize circulation. The authors then examine directly the role of ownership. Once
they control for geographic clustering of ownership groups, they nd that two newspapers
with the same owner are no more similar politically than two random newspapers, implying
small (if any) ownership eects. Also, they do not nd any evidence of a role of reporter
preferences and the party of local or state politicians in determining slant. They conclude
that the role of supply-side incentives in shaping the average slant of U.S. newspapers is likely
to be small, and that, on average, the newspaper political slant is determined by demand.
Other studies show that supply side incentives can be important. Larcinese, Puglisi and
32Snyder (2007) present a case study of the editorial and news content of the Los Angeles
Times before and after Otis Chandler took over in 1960. Chandler sets out to change the
previous Republican orientation of the paper. Indeed, the LA Times shifts from endorsing
mostly Republican candidates before 1960 to endorsing mostly Democrats by 1970, while no
corresponding change in the political preferences of the electorate takes place at the same
time. In addition, while before 1960 the journal provided less coverage of high unemployment
under Republican presidents than under Democratic presidents, this bias disappears after
1965. Larcinese et al. extend this analysis to a cross-section of newspaper and present some
evidence that the partisan coverage of unemployment news responds more to owner prefer-
ences (measured by newspaper endorsements) than to local electoral preferences. Gilens and
Hertzman (2008) show that newspapers whose parent companies have an interest in televi-
sion stations aected by a proposed de-regulation of broadcast television cover the debate
over that de-regulation signicantly dierently than those whose parent companies did not
have such an interest.
Durante and Knight (2009) test for ownership eects in the Italian media where one
entrepreneur, Silvio Berlusconi, owns the three major private television stations and controls
several of the national newspapers. Berlusconi also indirectly exercises control over the public
television station when his party is in power. Using measures of on-air-time for the prime
minister and opposition party leader, Durante and Knight nd substantial ownership eects.
Berlusconi's television stations devote substantially more time to the prime minister when
Berlusconi's coalition is in power than when the other coalition is leading the government.
Moreover, the share of time devoted to the dierent politicians by the public station shift
once Berlusconi's coalition comes into power. Even then, one public channel (Rai 3) oer
more balanced coverage. Interestingly, some of the audience switches to this channel from
the other channels when Berlusconi's party gets into power. This suggests a demand for less
politicized information, even though this substitution eect is quite small.
Another form of supply-side incentive comes from advertisers. Since the media depends
33heavily on advertising for revenue, advertisers may push quid-pro-quo implicit agreements
to increase their advertising expenditure as long as the media coverage is positive towards
their products. Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) show that nancial magazines that depend
heavily on advertising from mutual funds appear to bias their reviews of funds in favor of
their advertisers. The identication is based on considering how the coverage of dierent
mutual funds in the news section (including recommending a fund) varies as a function of the
advertising space purchased by a mutual fund family in the previous 12 months. Interestingly,
the New York Times and Wall Street Journal display no such correlation, suggesting that
high reputation can indeed limit these distortions.
5 How Does Persuasion Aect Equilibrium Outcomes?
The evidence reviewed so far sheds light separately on the responses of receivers and on the
behavior of senders. Often, however, the ultimate welfare eects of persuasion depend on
the way senders and receivers interact in equilibrium. In this section, we review a handful
of studies that estimate the equilibrium eects of persuasive communications.
One series of four studies considers how communication through the news media aects
equilibrium policy outcomes. These are distinguished from the studies reviewed in section 2.2
because they consider the equilibrium response of politicians to persuasive communication
between the media and voters. The common theme in these studies is that media coverage
leads politicians to respond more to the demands of voters, in most cases plausibly increasing
voter welfare. Stromberg (2004) studies the diusion of radio in the 1930's. Using plausibly
exogenous variation in the availability of radio signals, he shows that localities that received
radio obtained larger quantities of federal dollars during the new deal, consistent with a
model where better information strengthens representatives' incentives.
Similarly, Stromberg and Snyder (2008) ask how representatives whose actions are heav-
ily covered by local newspapers behave dierently from those whose actions are less cov-
34ered. They nd that more newspaper coverage, instrumented with the \congruence"between
congressional districts and newspaper markets, leads representatives to exert more eort
directed at constituent interests (as measured by testifying before committees and serving
on committees that control pork spending), and to bring home more federal dollars.
Besley and Burgess (2002) use data on newspaper circulation, government aid, and eco-
nomic conditions for a panel of Indian states from 1958-1992 to show that aid responds
more to food shortages and oods in areas with higher newspaper circulation per capita
(controlling for income and other demographics). They estimate that a 10 percent drop in
food production leads to a 1 percent increase in food aid for states at median newspaper
circulation per capita, but a 2.3 percent increase in food aid for states at the 75th percentile
of newspaper circulation per capita. These results are driven mainly by circulation of local
language newspapers.
Finally, Eisensee and Stromberg (2007) look at the way news media coverage inuences
the provision of foreign aid in response to natural disasters. They rst show that disasters
that occur at the same time as other newsworthy events, such as the Olympics, receive
much less news coverage than disasters that occur at other times. Using this variation to
instrument for news coverage of disasters, they estimate that news coverage increases the
probability that the US sends aid by about 16 percent on average, and by as much as 70
percent for stories on the margin of begin covered or not. They interpret these results to
mean that public outcry over disasters is largely driven by news coverage and that it is the
public response which provides an incentive to politicians to send aid.
A second category of studies on the equilibrium eects of persuasion is the extensive
empirical literature on the indirect eects of advertising. The direct communication between
advertisers and consumers in turn aects market structure, prots, product quality, and
prices. As Bagwell and others have noted, many of these papers study cross-sectional or
time-series correlations between measures of advertising intensity and outcome variables.
Given that advertising is simultaneously determined with most of these outcomes, most of
35these results do not have a clear causal interpretation. Here, we focus on one strand of this
literature that we nd most interesting: evidence on the way limits on retail advertising
aect equilibrium retail prices. This literature speaks directly to the question of whether
advertising appears to promote competition by decreasing search costs and increasing market
transparency, as argued by Stigler (1961) and others, consistent with welfare-increasing
eects of advertising.
Bagwell (2007) reviews a number of studies beginning with Benham (1972) that look at
the cross-sectional relationship between advertising restrictions and price levels. In markets
for eyeglasses, prescription drugs, gasoline, and optometry, these studies all nd that prices
are signicantly lower in markets where price advertising is allowed relative to markets where
it is banned. Of course, advertising restrictions could be correlated with other determinants
of prices.
Two studies use changes in rms' ability to advertise, rather than cross-sectional cor-
relations. Glazer (1981) studies a 1978 newspaper strike in New York City. The strike
signicantly reduces the supply of newspaper advertising space. Glazer studies the prices at
supermarkets in Queens which depend especially heavily on newspapers for price advertis-
ing, using supermarkets in neighboring Nassau county (which was much less aected by the
strike) as a control. He reports that prices of the six products studied rises about 6 percent
in Queens relative to Nassau during the strike and returns to their earlier relative levels after
the strike. He also shows that prices in local groceries in Queens (which do little newspaper
advertising) do not change signicantly.
Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) study a 1996 Supreme Court decision that ended a ban on
price advertising by liquor stores in Rhode Island. Consistent with a pro-competitive eect
of advertising, the Rhode Island Liquor Stores Association was on record as supporting
the advertising ban because they believed \smaller retailers would be devastated" by price
advertising by larger (and lower-price) stores. The authors estimate that, relative to a control
group of stores in Massachusetts not aected by the ban, prices fell by between 0.4 and 0.8
36percent in Rhode Island after the ban, although, in contrast to the earlier literature, these
dierences are not statistically signicant.
6 Conclusion
How does persuasion operate? We have analyzed communication directed at consumers,
voters, donors, and investors. The evidence suggests that persuasive communication is more
eective for voters, donors and investors than it is for consumers. This could be due to
the fact that there is more crowding of messages to consumers. The evidence also suggests
that personal contact is a key determinant of the eectiveness of persuasion across contexts.
While this may be due to dierences in the information conveyed, it is consistent with social
pressure playing an important role.
We have also surveyed how the evidence supports dierent models of persuasion. The
predictions of belief-based models with rational receivers clearly nd support in the data.
At least in some circumstances, receivers respond more when they are more uncertain and
when messages are credible, senders are constrained by market forces to limit distortion,
and increasing the supply of persuasive messages makes markets more competitive. At
the same time, there is also clear evidence of systematic departures from these models.
Unsophisticated receivers neglect incentives, non-informative dimensions of messages aect
behavior, and receivers take costly steps to avoid persuasive communication.
Testing these models is important in part because of their implications for welfare. The
broad conclusion from theory is that welfare eects are more likely to be positive when
persuasion functions as information and receivers are rational. The evidence in this survey
suggests that the answer will depend on the setting and on the receiver: small and large
investors, for example, display very dierent levels sophistication.
We see three especially important gaps in the existing literature. First, there is little
evidence on the long-term eects of persuasion which, for many questions, may be the most
37important horizon. The modern empirical literature has made great strides by exploiting
both randomized and natural experiments, but these experiments often privilege the estima-
tion of short-term eects. For example, of the fteen studies reviewed in Table 1, only four
examine impacts over a horizon of a year or longer.
Second, few studies are designed to test directly models of persuasion. For example, there
is limited evidence on how receivers take into account sender incentives or on how receivers
seek information. Further, most of the existing evidence provides qualitative, as opposed to
quantitative, tests of the models. This makes it dicult to estimate precise economic and
welfare implications. As a starting point, a consistent quantitative measure of persuasion
eects, the persuasion rate (Table 1), can resolve apparent inconsistencies across studies.
Third, some topics of great importance have been largely neglected so far. A rst one
is the role of competition. The proposition that competition among senders will limit the
scope for distortion has played a central role in the way speech is regulated in many domains,
with very limited evidence to bear. A second one is the role of political persuasion in non-
democratic societies. Virtually all the evidence is from the US or other democracies. Yet, one
of the original motivations for studying persuasion is its role in autocracies and dictatorships.
On all these topics, more evidence is clearly needed.
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47Appendix { Documentation of Table 1
[Not for publication]
We discuss here the data used for the construction of the information used to compute
persuasion rates in Table 1.
Persuading Consumers. For the Simester et al. (2007) paper, the information comes from
personal communication with the authors. We do not observe the exposure rate (how many
more people read the catalogs in the treatment group) and hence assume eT   eC = 1: For
the Bertrand et at. (forthcoming) paper, we take the take-up in the control group tC from
the Summary Statistics (Table II), and add the treatment eect (Table IIIa) for respectively
a female photo (.0057) and 2 points of interest rate (2*.0029). Even though the interest rates
vary between 3.25% and 11.75%, for illustrative purposes we take the average interest rate
for the Medium Risk group (6.5% monthly) as the control group.
Persuading Voters. For Gosnell (1926), we take the estimate of tT and tC from the second
paragraph on page 870. For Gerber and Green (2000), the results are from Table 3 for
the eect of canvassing and from Table 5 for the eect of the mailers. For Green, Gerber,
and Nickerson (2003), the estimation of tT and tC is based on Table 1 in their paper. The
estimate of exposure rate dierence comes from the third column in Table 2. For Green and
Gerber (2001), we calculate the tT and tC and exposure rate dierence based on Table 3 in
their paper.
For the calculation of eects on vote share, the computation of persuasion eects is
slightly dierent (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007). Denote by vi is the vote share for the
party supported by the media in treatment i; ti is the turnout, and v0 and t0 are the
respective variables in absence of an intervention. The vote share in treatment j equals
vj = (r0 + (1   r0)ejf)=tj: Writing out vT  vC and substituting for tj = t0 +(1   t0)ejf to





t0 (1   v0)
: (2)
48Using the approximations tC = t0 and vC = v0, the expression simplies to f = ((vT   vC)=(eT   eC))
(tT=(1   vC)). This expression takes into account that the media can aect voting along
two margins|by inducing voters to switch party, or by inducing non-voters to turn-out. For
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), the estimated vT   vC is from Table IV, column (4). The
additional term tT=(1   vC) equals 1.024. The exposure rate eT   eC is from Table VIII,
Column (2) using the diary audience measure. For Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya
(2007), we estimate vT and vC based on Table 1 and Table 3 adding the vote share for the
parties OVR, SPS, and Yabloko, and the exposure rate dierence eT eC is from Table 7. The
additional term tT=(1   vC) equals :79=:832 = :949: For Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009),
the Democratic vote share (based on self-reports) in the control group vC is :41=:73 = :56
(Table 1c). The treatment eect vT  vC is :112 (Table 4, Column (4)). The additional term
tT=(1   vC) equals :72=:44 = 1:64 (Table 1c) The dierence in exposure rate is from page 9
in paper.
For Gentzkow (2006), we take the estimate of tC from the mean of base-year turnout
(Table 1) and combine it with a treatment eect of 10   :196 =  1:96 percent (column
(4) in Table 4). The exposure rate dierence is an approximation of the share of population
with TV exposure from Figure 4. For Gentzkow and Shapiro (2009), we take tC from page
14 and combine it with the treatment eect of the introduction of one newspaper (Table 2,
Column (1)); the exposure rate dierence is the estimated eect on the share of population
reading a local paper when present (page 14).
Persuading Donors. In all four studies in this Section, a control group with no solicita-
tion is not included in the study. However, we know that unsolicited donations (or survey
completion) are very rare, so we approximate them to zero, hence tC = 0 (and eC = 0). For
List and Lucking-Reiley (2001), we calculate tT from Table 1 averaging across the conditions
with and without refunds. The exposure rate dierence in this study is assumed to be 1 for
lack of better measure of how many people read the mailing. For Landry et al. (2006), we
aggregate across all treatments (Table 2) and computing the share giving (tT) and the share
49opening the door (eT). For DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2009), we take the share
completing the survey (tT) and the share opening the door (eT) from Table 4, Treatment
NoFlyer-$0-10 min. For Falk (2009), we take the estimate of tT from the results in Table 1,
and the exposure rate dierence is assumed to be 1.
50  49 
Figure 1. Distribution of stock recommendations by analysts 






















Notes: The Figure plots the share of recommendations that are are “Strong Sell”, “Sell”, “Hold”, “Buy”, 
and “Strong Buy” for both unaffiliated and affiliated analysts. Affiliated analysts are analysts that work for 
an investment bank that has recently undertaken a banking transaction for the company that the analyst 
covers. Source of data is Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2009.
51Variable: Persuasion Rate f (Share of Listeners Convinced by Media)
Paper Treatment Control Context Variable t Year Recipients Time Sample Treatment Control Exposure Persuasion
Horizon size group t T group t C rate e T-e C rate f
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Presuading Consumers
Simester et al. (2007) (NE) 17 clothing catalogs sent 12 catalogs Share Purchasing 2002 Infrequent Cust. 1 year N = 10,000 36.7% 33.9% 100%* 4.3%
>= 1 item Frequent Cust. N = 10,000 69.1% 66.8% 100%* 7.0%
Bertrand et al. (forthcoming) (FE) Mailer with female photo Mailer no photo Applied for loan 2003 1 month N=53,194 9.1% 8.5% 100%* 0.6%
Mailer with 4.5% interest rate Mailer 6.5% i.r. 9.1% 8.5% 100%* 0.6%
Persuading Voters
Gosnell (1926) Card reminding of registration No card Presid. Elect. Registration 1924 Chicago voters Few days N = 5,700 42.0% 33.0% 100.0% 13.4%
Gerber and Green (2000) (FE) Door-to-Door GOTV Canvassing No GOTV Congress. Elect. Turnout 1998 New Haven voters Few days N = 29,380 47.2% 44.8% 27.9% 15.6%
GOTV Mailing  of 1-3 Cards No GOTV 42.8% 42.2% 100%* 1.0%
Green, Gerber,  Door-to-Door Canvassing No GOTV Local Elect. Turnout 2001 Voters in 6 cities Few days N = 18,933 31.0% 28.6% 29.3% 11.8%
and Nickerson (2003) (FE)
Green and Gerber (2001) (FE) Phone Calls By Youth Vote No GOTV General Elect. Turnout 2000 Voters in 4 cities Few days N = 4,377 71.1% 66.0% 73.7% 20.5%
Phone Calls 18-30 Year-Olds No GOTV General Elect. Turnout 2000 Voters in 2 cities N = 4,278 41.6% 40.5% 41.4% 4.5%
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007)  Availab. of Fox News Via Cable No F.N. via cable Presid. Elect. Rep. Vote Share '96-'00" 28 US States 0-4 years N = 66m 56.4% 56.0% 3.7% 11.6%
+
Enikolopov, Petrova, and 
Zhuravskaya (2007) (NE)
Availability of independent anti-
Putin TV station (NTV) No NTV General Elect.
Vote Share  of 
anti-Putin parties 1999 Russian voters 3 months N = 45m 19.0% 16.8% 19.9% 10.2%
+
Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan 
(2009) (FE)
Free 10-week subscription to 
Washington Post No Subscr. Governor Elect.
Dem. Vote Share 
(stated in survey) 2005 Virginia 2 months N = 1,011 67.2% 56.0% 92.0% 20.0%
+
Gentzkow (2006) (NE) Exposure to Television No Television Presid. Elect. Turnout 40s-'50s All US Counties 10 years N = 100m* 54.5% 56.5% 80.0% 4.3%
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2009)  Exposure to Local Newspaper No local paper Presid. Elect. Turnout All US Counties 0-4 years N = 100m* 67.8% 67.0% 46.0% 5.1%
List and Lucking Reiley Fund-raiser mailer with low seed No mailer Share  1999 Florida donors 1-3 weeks N = 1,000 3.7% 0% 100%* 3.7%
(2001) (FE) Fund-raiser mailer with high seed No mailer Giving Money N = 1,000 8.2% 0% 100%* 8.2%
Landry et al. (2006) (FE) Door-To-Door Fund-raising No visit Campaign Share 2004 North  Carolina immediate N = 4,833 10.8% 0% 36.3% 29.7%
Campaign for University Center Giving Money Donors
DellaVigna et al. (2009) (FE) Door-To-Door Survey No visit Surveys Share Completing 2008 Chicago immediate N = 607 10.3% 0% 41.4% 24.8%
Falk (2009) (FE) Fund-raiser mailer with no gift No mailer No gift Share  2004 Swiss donors 1-3 weeks N = 3,237 12.2% 0% 100%* 12.2%
Mailer with gift (4 post-cards) No mailer Giving Money N = 3,347 20.6% 0% 100%* 20.6%




Loan offer in 
South Africa







Notes: Calculations of persuasion rates by the authors. The list of papers indicates whetherthe study is a natural experiment("NE") or a field experiment("FE"). Columns (9) and (10) report the value of the behavior studied(Column (4)) for the Treatment and Control group. Column (11) reports the Exposure Rate, that is, the
differencebetweenthe Treatmentand the Control group in the share of peopleexposedto the Treatment. Column(12) computesthe estimatedpersuasionrate f as 100*(tT-tC)/((eT-eC)*(1-tC)).The persuasion rate denotesthe share of the audiencethat was not previouslyconvincedand that is convincedby the message.The studies
where the exposure rate (Column (11) is denotedby "100%*" are cases in which the data on the differentialexposure rate betweentreatment and control is not available. In these case, we assume eT-eC=100%, which implies that the persuasion rate is a lower bound for the actual persuasion rate. In the studies on "Persuading
Donors", evenin cases in whichan explicitcontrolgroup with no maileror no visit was not run, we assume that such a controlwouldhaveyielded tC=0%, sincethesebehaviorsare very rare in absenceof a fund-raiser. For studies with voteshare as dependentvariable (denotedwith a "+"), see AppendixA for the expressionfor the
persuasion rate. For additional details, see Appendix A